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Abstract. This paper examines the issue of 
board composition of family businesses which 
were established in the Czech Republic in the 
1990s, after more than 40 years of private enter-
prises being forcefully suspended by the socia-
list regime. So far, there has been no available 
research investigating manufacturing sector in 
the Czech Republic (CR) from the perspective 
of board composition, i.e. the representation of 
external members and gender diversity, on the 
characteristic behaviours of the boards of family 
businesses and their strategic adaptability. This 
longitudinal study of four family businesses pro-
vides valuable information which have not yet 
been observed against the background of board 
composition in the manufacturing sector. The 
results of the interviews conducted in these bu-
sinesses yield interesting findings about the fact 
that gender diversity along with the exclusive re-
presentation of family members on a corporate 
board has a very positive influence on strategic 
adaptability and an impact on the current direc-
tion of the business. The results of the study also 
show how family businesses fulfilling these condi-
tions are better able to cope with negative exter-
nal influences (e.g. the financial crisis).
Keywords: board composition, family bu-
siness, transition economy, corporate gover-
nance, gender, nepotism, paternalism, strategic 
adaptability.
1. INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance represents a sig-
nificant factor determining the long-term 
prosperity of business activities of family 
firms (Banalieva et al., 2014; Brunninge et 
al., 2007) in countries with a short modern 
history of family enterprises such as the 
Czech Republic. Family enterprises had 
a long tradition in what is now the Czech 
Republic, beginning in the 16th and 17th cen-
turies with the economic activities of noble 
families (Čornej, 1992). However, the real 
turning point for family enterprises came 
with the onset of socialism in the 1940s, 
when all the factories were nationalized. 
The rise of socialism with the implemen-
tation of planned economy in the Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE) states and in the 
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Czech Republic meant the total eradication 
of family enterprises. The tradition of fam-
ily firms built up over many Years was itself 
completely disrupted by the nationalization 
of property. 
Corporate governance of family firms 
with a violently interrupted and negative 
history of entrepreneurship in CEE states 
has not yet been given sufficient attention, 
despite the fact that the structure of bodies, 
their activities and role greatly influence 
the day-to-day running of the family busi-
ness (FB) and its performance (Corbetta & 
Salvato, 2004). This applies not only to the 
Czech Republic but also to all of the CEE 
countries that have undergone the difficult 
period of transformation of the economy 
(Smallbone & Welter, 2001).
The aim of this paper is to present 
board compositions of family businesses 
with characteristic behaviours which arose 
in the manufacturing sector in the Czech 
Republic and show how the current direc-
tion of family businesses caused by charac-
teristic behaviours influences the strategic 
adaptability.
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The issue of corporate governance has 
been described extensively, mostly in rela-
tion to larger companies, both in terms of 
maximizing value for shareholders (Fama, 
1980) and associated activities within the 
exercise of ownership rights (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983), sometimes involving ex-
ternal financing of companies listed on the 
stock exchange (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
The administration of family companies 
has been well-documented, especially in 
environments with long-term, stable de-
velopment (Ponomareva & Ahlberg, 2016; 
García-Ramos & García-Olalla, 2011; 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001), which is espe-
cially characteristic of countries with a de-
veloped market economy. The creation of 
boards consisting of family member in the 
Czech Republic in the 1990s was therefore 
entirely spontaneous, without any influence 
from findings regarding the advantages and 
limitations of family businesses, which 
were unknown in the Czech Republic at 
that time.  
In this paper we consider a family firm 
to be a business organization in which the 
members of one or more families, who also 
run the company, have the controlling inter-
est. “Family involvement in entrepreneur-
ship assumes that at least two family mem-
bers work in the firm” (Sten, 2007). Family 
firms examined can therefore be defined as 
companies in which at least two members 
of one family work in and have a direct in-
fluence on the running of the firm (Taguiry 
& Davis, 1996). Behaviours of boards of 
family firms can be described by the char-
acteristics which determine the long-term 
development and strategic adaptability of 
these companies. Strategic adaptability 
is defined as a cushion of actual or poten-
tial resources which allows an organization 
to adapt successfully to internal pressures 
for adjustment or to external pressures 
for changes in policy as well as to initiate 
changes in strategy with respect to the ex-
ternal environment (McKee et al., 1989).
2.1. Basis of the composition and 
structure of the bodies of family 
firms 
Current knowledge regarding the ap-
propriate corporate governance structure 
in business corporations emphasizes the 
influential aspect linked with board inde-
pendence (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazzura, 
2004) represented by a higher proportion 
of external board members. In countries in 
the post-transformation phase of the market 
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economy, where no family firms have a 
modern business history lasting more than 
25 years, it is still possible to encounter a 
generally prevailing concept of supervision 
over the company by family representatives 
(Lane et al., 2006). This is mainly due to 
trust (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001) and prefer-
ences for other family members (Collin & 
Ahlberg, 2012). However, it is also possible 
to detect some negative factors linked, for 
example, with rivalry and conflicts between 
family members (Tagiuri & Davis, 1996), 
which demonstrates that a pure representa-
tion of family representatives on the board 
of family firms is not a mandatory standard. 
Unfortunately, no study on gender di-
versity in the bodies of family firms has 
been conducted yet and its impact on the 
direction of the business, which has under-
gone a transformation in recent times. This 
points to a gap in research into the board 
composition of family businesses founded 
in the transition economy in terms of the 
representation of external top managers 
on boards as well as the representation of 
women on the boards of family businesses. 
On the basis of these findings, the following 
research question can be formulated: 
RQ1: What is the typical board com-
position of FBs founded in the transition 
economy?
2.2. Characteristic behaviours of the 
boards of family businesses
In general, the behaviour of family busi-
nesses can be viewed as a system of ap-
pointments in which preference is given to 
relatives over other, frequently better quali-
fied candidates (Bellow, 2003). Nepotism 
thus represents the imagined consequences 
of the predominance of family logic over 
corporate rationality (Kets de Vries, 1996). 
In the past, nepotism was often perceived 
as a negative phenomenon. Companies in 
which nepotism manifests itself often have 
a problem retaining capable external work-
ers, who leave as a result of the incompe-
tence of the leadership of the family firm 
exercised by family representatives . For 
regular employees of the company who are 
not family members, the inability to man-
age the company and the associated lack 
of authority can have a very demotivating 
effect, leading to a disruption to the corpo-
rate climate, dissatisfaction with the work 
carried out, and a consequent reduction in 
work motivation and performance (Kets de 
Vries, 1996; Nelton, 1998). 
Nevertheless, despite the general per-
ception of nepotism as a negative phe-
nomenon for family businesses, there are 
well-known studies describing family firms 
which practise nepotism and do not suffer 
a decline in corporate performance in the 
long run –the performance of some even 
exceeds the sector average (Anderso & 
Reeb, 2004; Miller et al., 2011).
Some studies (Jaskiewicz et al., 2013; 
Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Miller et al., 
2011) point out that nepotism can also be 
beneficial to a family company. If the fami-
ly is in danger of losing its property through 
a transfer of the controlling interest to an 
external employee, family firms tend to 
choose a board member from the ranks of 
the family (Lin & Hu, 2007), thereby pre-
venting the loss of ownership of the compa-
ny; this is probably why research focusing 
on “stewardship in family firms” (Anderson 
& Reeb, 2003; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 
2005) highlights the benefits of “continu-
ous family ownership”, which can enhance 
company´s performance, its long-term ori-
entation and also its strategic adaptability.  
Within this context, Jaskiewicz et al. 
(2013) define two types of nepotism: enti-
tlement nepotism and reciprocal nepotism. 
Entitlement nepotism is perceived as a 
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negative form of nepotism, which is linked 
with the involvement of an unqualified or 
badly prepared “nepot” (eng. descendant) 
in the business practice. This form of nep-
otism can manifest itself both in lower to 
middle management and in the highest po-
sitions, i.e. in the firm’s statutory bodies or 
even in the position of the company direc-
tor. An ill-advised change in the company’s 
management influenced by nepotism which 
fails to achieve the corporate goals can ulti-
mately lead to the demise of the family firm 
(Nelton, 1998; Kets de Vries, 1996). The 
existence of entitlement nepotism is also 
supported by the fact that only one third of 
family firms survive the transition from one 
generation to the next (Tyee, 2007).
On the other hand, Jackiewicz et al. 
(2013) see the success of family firms that 
make use of reciprocal nepotism as be-
ing due to “transfer of tacit knowledge” 
(Nonaka, 1994; Gatarik & Born, 2015), 
which is considered (Coff et al., 2006 and 
Matusik & Hill, 1998) to be one of the key 
elements in the company’s competitiveness 
and performance. This results in a concept 
of family enterprise in which it is very dif-
ficult for the external environment to access 
or imitate tacit knowledge in the form of a 
unique know-how. This kind of know-how 
conceived as “personal, context-specific 
and acquired by experience” (D’Eredita 
& Barreto, 2006: 1824), is the privilege 
of people who have personal experience 
of utilizing it (Turner & Makhija, 2006). 
Reciprocal nepotism, which enables the 
transfer of tacit knowledge from generation 
to generation within the board, may be one 
of the factors which supports the sustain-
ability of the company in the hands of the 
family (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2015; 
Collin & Ahlberg, 2012) and thereby also 
increases the strategic adaptability of the 
business to external influences of the envi-
ronment (Ponomareva & Ahlberg, 2016).
In addition to the transfer of tacit 
knowledge, another factor supporting the 
orientation towards maintaining the com-
pany is the board members’ attitude to 
risk. Jaffe & Lane (2004) state that family 
firms (dynasties) often work on the princi-
ple of deep moral and spiritual values with 
the aim of keeping property in the hands of 
the family in the long run and maintaining 
the company independent of the surround-
ing environment. This is probably another 
reason why family firms are more averse to 
risk compared to non-family firms (Naldi et 
al., 2007). 
Family firms’ aversion to risk has 
been demonstrated by a number of stud-
ies (Donckels & Frohlich, 1991; Zahra, 
2005) and is frequently related to the com-
pany ownership and the corporate govern-
ance structure applied in the family firm. 
Families often make a substantial invest-
ment in their family firms and thus bear the 
full risk of a poor investment (Naldi et al., 
2007; Gedajlovic et al., 2004). Therefore, if 
we proceed from the findings of the above-
mentioned authors, it can be assumed that 
the greater the family’s ownership rights in 
the family firm, the fewer risks they will 
take. This manifests itself in a lower orien-
tation towards growth, a general conserva-
tiveness in the business practice (Donckelse 
& Fröhlich, 1991) and an orientation to-
wards the long-term sustainability of the 
company (Jaffe & Lane, 2004; Miller & 
Le Breton-Miller, 2015; Collin & Ahlberg, 
2012) connected with the strategic adapt-
ability (Ponomareva & Ahlberg, 2016; 
McKee et al., 1989) of family businesses.   
During the exercise of corporate gov-
ernance, family firms often have to contend 
with the issue of paternalism. Typical fea-
tures of paternalism exhibited in the lead-
ership of a family firm include an inclina-
tion towards autocracy, a strong need for 
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control, a lack of trust in other co-workers, 
a need for recognition and an inability to 
delegate (Kets de Vries, 1996; Mussollino 
& Calabro, 2014). Here paternalism is per-
ceived as a protective and dominant ideol-
ogy (Koiranen, 2004). In the early stages 
the founder’s autocratic behaviour leads 
to good results for the family firm, which 
is manifested in its growth. The associated 
long-term orientation of family members on 
the board represents a considerable compet-
itive advantage (Coff et al., 2006; Matusik 
& Hill, 1998; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 
2015; Collin & Ahlberg, 2012). An orien-
tation towards maintaining the company is 
typical of family firms and is closely related 
to trust and risk aversion. The trust exhib-
ited in family businesses strengthens stake-
holders’ faith that family firms will honour 
their commitments. Trust also strengthens 
mutual cooperation and interpersonal rela-
tions, reduces the threat of conflict, lowers 
transaction costs and facilitates effective 
conflict resolution, thereby supports the 
running of the company (Sundaramurthy, 
2008; Rousseau et al., 1998). The strength 
of mutual relations can then motivate indi-
viduals to take more responsibility for their 
actions – in this case, their work in the fam-
ily firm. However, when a situation arises 
where an incoming family member as-
sumes a major role on the board, the nega-
tive side of paternalistic behaviour often 
manifests itself too. The original owner/
founder exhibits mistrust towards incom-
ing board members in the form of constant 
control. The autocratic behaviour of the 
original founder predominates over the be-
haviour of the new management (Mussolino 
& Calabro, 2014; Sharma et al., 2003). 
The situation often causes an increased 
lack of clarity in executive decision-mak-
ing and leads to disputes over jurisdic-
tion with a negative impact on employees 
(Nelton, 1998). Similarly, Dyer (1986) 
and Mussolino & Calabro (2014) state that 
family leaders retain all the essential infor-
mation and decision-making powers in their 
own hands.
2.3. Direction and impact on the 
strategic adaptability of family 
businesses
The board of a family firm can be re-
garded as a complex arrangement both 
from the legislative viewpoint and from 
the viewpoint of the social and psychologi-
cal arrangement (Bettinelli, 2011; Collin & 
Ahlberg, 2012). An awareness of the “own-
ership” of the company entails certain rights 
and responsibilities (Koiranen, 2002). It is 
this responsibility for the company which 
motivates the founder to engage in a con-
duct which is effective in the long run by 
employing strategies oriented towards 
the long-term future (Le Breton-Miller & 
Miller, 2015; Jaskiewicz et al., 2013). Le 
Breton-Miller & Miller (2006) define long-
term orientation as priorities, goals and 
concrete investments that come to fruition 
over an extended time period. The question 
remains whether strategies influenced by 
spontaneously arising characteristics typical 
of the behaviour of family businesses will 
affect the direction of the business positive-
ly or negatively in the long run. According 
to Le Breton-Miller & Miller (2006) long-
term strategies include good stewardship 
aimed at reducing risk, investing in people 
and knowledge, enduring relationship with 
stakeholders. These investments can be 
observed as the characteristic behaviours 
presented by the relationship towards risk 
(Naldi et al., 2007), nepotism (Jaskiewicz 
et al., 2013), paternalism (Mussolino & 
Calabro, 2014; Sharma et al., 2003), cen-
tralization, orientation towards sustainabil-
ity (Sundaramurthy, 2008; Rousseau et al., 
1998, Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006).
The evaluation of this impact from the 
viewpoint of strategic adaptability can be 
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assessed, for example, by the retention of 
the company in the family’s possession 
(Bettinelli, 2011; Fama & Jensen, 1983), 
by indebtedness (Carney, 2005) or by the fi-
nancial ratio ROA (McKee et al., 1989). 
RQ2: What are the characteristic be-
haviours of the board of a family business 
with regard to their long-term strategy?
2.4. Research design
The research focuses on the period of 
transformation of the economy including 
the period associated with the post-trans-
formation phase of the development of fam-
ily businesses. The time frame of the trans-
formation period is quite clearly defined 
by the beginning of the conversion of the 
planned economy into a market economy 
and bounded by the year 1989 or 1990. It is 
difficult to define the end of the transforma-
tion period and the beginning of the post-
transformation period; nevertheless, some 
authors (Žídek, 2006) dealing with the is-
sue of transformation set the end of the 
transformation of the Czech economy into 
a market economy as the Czech Republic’s 
accession to the European Union and with 
that the fulfilling of the conditions for the 
operation of the principles of the market 
economy, i.e. the year 2004. This is subse-
quently reflected in the framework for stag-
ing the research.
3. METHODOLOGY
Based on the internal characteristics of 
the board, which are primarily the result of 
sociological factors, the performance of the 
companies and their capability for sustain-
ability on the market over a period of 10 
years were monitored. The research we car-
ried out on a sample of several family firms 
also covers research into social relations, 
which is rather subjective in nature and ne-
cessitated the use of qualitative techniques.    
3.1. Sampling
the research was carried out between 
2006 and 2015, when in the initial part of 
the research 91 family firms were identified 
from the Albertina database of businesses 
from the manufacturing industry in the CR 
(432 companies) on the basis of certain cri-
teria satisfying the definition of family busi-
ness. All the companies in Albertina data-
base had to fulfil the following conditions: 
have publicly available financial statement 
and specifically, at least two family mem-
bers had to be directly involved in the run-
ning of the business and at the same time 
also work in the family firm (Odehnalová, 
2008, according to Lukeš & Nový, 2005; 
Sten, 2007). 
Following on from the established re-
search questions RQ1, RQ2, businesses ful-
filling the conditions outlined below were 
selected from the database based and con-
tacted. In light of the aforementioned basis 
for the research and the research questions, 
we opted for the multiple case study method. 
The reason for this was that multiple case 
studies typically provide a stronger base for 
explanation (De Massis & Kotlar, 2014). 
Therefore, case studies with different board 
composition were chosen so as to make it 
possible to investigate characteristic phe-
nomena and their impact on business’s long-
term strategies and strategic adaptability. For 
an appropriate configuration of the selected 
sample of family firms covering the required 
phenomena under research, the following 
conditions for defining the sample to answer 
the research questions were set:
1. Businesses which had more than one 
member of a family on the board, so as 
to ensure, among other things, that the 
definition of a family business was met. 
2. Businesses that represent various sec-
tors, i.e. mechanical engineering, 
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construction and the manufacturing 
industry.
3. Businesses where the representation of 
family members on boards was as di-
verse as possible. 
4. Businesses where another member of 
the family was also employed in a non-
managerial position, in order to deter-
mine the influence on long-term func-
tioning and the strategies applied.
5. Businesses that have been on the market 
for some time and have a healthy eco-
nomic situation, so as to be able to mon-
itor them over as long a period as possi-
ble – their economic situation was good, 
so they could be expected to survive for 
the foreseeable future, making it pos-
sible to study their long-term strategy, 
strategic adaptability and the related im-
pact on the direction of the businesses.
3.2. The approach to data analysis
The first stage of the research was based 
on reading the literature from the secondary 
sources, specifically the business databases 
Albertina and justice.cz that provide infor-
mation on the industry sector the company 
belonged to, the year of its establishment, 
the number of employees, the number of 
family members represented in the company 
board and gender diversity of the board . 
This information was used as the basis for 
answering RQ1. 
In order to answer RQ2, the company 
representatives were provided with a ques-
tionnaire focusing on company’s position 
in the market from the perspective of their 
ownership structure, the characteristic phe-
nomena in the family business and their in-
fluence on developing strategy.
In order to provide the missing in-
formation and answer RQ2 a field study 
was carried out on a sample of four fam-
ily businesses. The firms were visited by 
the same researcher in the years 2011 and 
2012 after prior telephone arrangement 
with the firms’ managers, which involved a 
brief explanation of the research objectives 
and how long the interview would last to 
collect the necessary, relevant data. The 
interviews lasted between 1 and 2 hours, 
while one was longer and lasted 3 hours as 
the company manager insisted it was nec-
essary to visit the entire firm. The inter-
views took place on company grounds. The 
interviews were always attended by one of 
the firm’s owners, who was also a family 
representative. The information gathered 
during the interviews were supplemented 
by other information concerning the in-
terview procedure, the respondents’ be-
haviour and their gestures and comments. 
The transcript for the interviews from all 
companies had 68 pages. The transcrip-
tion, categorization and data coding were 
all carried out by the same researcher. 
Subsequently, for the purpose of evaluation 
Table 1. Cooperating family firms
Business Activity according to CZ - NACE Year founded
Number of 
employees
% of family 




Firm A C.31 1991 96 100% no
Firm B F.41 1992 110 100% yes
Firm C C.25 1996 83 100% yes
Firm D F.42 1994 65 33% no
Source: authors according to internal materials of the observed companies
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another researcher was brought in so that 
the categorization and coding could be 
carried out independently, thereby ensur-
ing impartial evaluation of data (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). Second researcher’s 
notes on the categorization and coding 
were then incorporated into the research, 
thus contributing to it. 
In order to answer RQ 2, the firms 
were subsequently observed on the basis 
of identifying characteristics (presented in 
the theoretical section) which influenced 
the strategy of the family business over the 
following years, while year-on-year infor-
mation on any changes to the board com-
position was recorded from the Albertina 
database and basic financial indicators of 
strategic adaptability, such as ROA and in-
debtedness were evaluated. An evaluation 
of the impact of the strategy on the current 
direction of companies and the associated 
behaviour of the observed family-business 
boards was done using a standard indicator 
for company performance – ROA (McKee 
et al., 1989). Due to the importance of in-
debtedness in the Czech Republic as a re-
sult of the transformation period of the 
economy and the associated lack of finan-
cial resources (Suchánek et al., 2011), we 
also used an indicator of indebtedness, 
which also allowed us to describe the rela-
tionship towards risk, which is a phenom-
enon that is observed as part of the sample 
of family businesses under research.
3.3. The trustworthiness, validity and 
reliability of the research data
We undertook certain steps to ensure the 
reliability of qualitative research (Pieper et 
al., 2015).  In accordance with methodo-
logical recommendations (Yin, 1994), in-
formation on companies from the question-
naire was supplemented with information 
from publicly available databases (justice.
cz and internal company documents includ-
ing annual reports) in order to gain as much 
information as possible about the firms’ op-
erations with regard to the characteristics 
of a family business. After adding informa-
tion from the publicly available sources, 
it was discovered that the sample was suf-
ficiently heterogeneous (Eisenhardt, 1989) 
to identify the differences in the boards of 
family businesses without distortion caused 
by external influences. The sample of firms 
differed in size, industry focus, length of 
the firm’s existence, representation of fam-
ily members in company management, and 
gender. All  information obtained from the 
theoretical study were incorporated into the 
semi-structured interview, which was sup-
plemented by information from the ques-
tionnaires carried out in the first stage of the 
research, in order to meet the conditions for 
the complementarity of data according to 
Downward & Mearman (2007).
Table 2. Framework for staging the research
Research 
activity
Identification of 432 
firms including 91 
family firms (Albertina 
database)
Formulation 
of RQ and 
choice of 4 
family firms






Time line 2006   2007   2008   2009 2010 2011   2012   2013   2014   2015
Source: authors 
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4. RESULTS
The information presented in the re-
search was obtained in several ways; firstly, 
data was gathered from public databases 
which were then supplemented by question-
naires and information from interviews and 
from visits to the companies. The results 
are presented in the following way ‒ there 
is a brief introduction to each family firm 
detailing the history and focus of the busi-
ness. This is followed by a description of 
the board’s composition, the parameters of 
nepotism, paternalism, relationship towards 
risk, orientation towards sustainability or 
profit, and centralization. Lastly, there is a 
comparison of the parameters relating to 
the family businesses and an evaluation of 
their impact on the basic economic indi-
cators achieved by the individual family 
businesses. 
4.1. Phase 1. Case analysis
4.1.1. Case study: Family business A.
Board composition - the management of 
the family business has been in the hands 
of two siblings since 1991 to the present 
day. Therefore, there have been no external 
managers although the firm has 64 employ-
ees. The company has two directors and 
two partners. The board is a family struc-
ture consisting of two brothers. The older 
brother has a 50.5% share and the younger 
49.5%. At the same time, both of them are 
directors and partners. Both directors are 
authorized to act independently on behalf of 
the company and approve contracts in the 
name of the company.
4.1.2. Characteristic phenomena 
Nepotism – the firm’s founders are also 
its owners. No other family members work 
for the firm. Therefore, there has been no 
nepotism in the company so far. As the 
owners’ children are still young, there have 
been no company successors.
Paternalism – the owners of the family 
business (two brothers) do not want to give 
up their ownership and executive rights – 
even in the future – and so their behaviour 
can be labelled as paternalist. This has been 
documented by their statement: “As the 
owners of the firm we want to know every-
thing that is happening in the company, be-
cause my brother’s family and mine all live 
within the company grounds. We also per-
sonally supervise production, we attend all 
of the company’s exhibitions and presenta-
tions, and we personally negotiate with our 
supplier” (quoted: the older brother, a part-
ner as well as director).
Centralization, orientation towards sus-
tainability – this paternalism is also evident 
in the strong centralization and mistrust to-
wards external employees among the com-
pany’s top management, an aversion to risk 
and a significant focus on the company’s 
sustainability. This has also been docu-
mented in a specific statement: “We’ve had 
some bad experience with external employ-
ees. Once we tried to employ a manager as 
the company economist and it didn’t turn 
out well. For us, it’s a big risk to hand over 
that responsibility to someone from the out-
side. It’s been the same with some software 
applications which were supposed to make 
the management and running of the com-
pany more efficient. Finally, my brother and 
I decided that it was better to keep the firm 
at such a size that we could manage it our-
selves” (quote: the older brother, a partner 
as well as director).
4.1.3. Case study: Family business B.
Board composition – since the start, the 
siblings have had equal ownership share of 
the company. The sister and three brothers 
are directors and partners of the firm and 
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each has a 25% share. The directors negoti-
ate and approve contracts in the company’s 
name. At present the company has three 
subsidiaries which are fully supervised by 
family members. The company owners, 
who are also its managers, actively partici-
pate each day in all of the firm’s operations, 
which means they are fully aware of how 
the firm is run.
4.1.4. Characteristic phenomena 
Orientation towards sustainability, cen-
tralization – in the words of one of the 
company managers, the company found-
er’s daughter, the goal of the firm is to: 
“Maintain a stable company which is able to 
satisfy the needs of the family. Therefore, the 
firm’s management isn’t planning to expand 
into foreign markets. The goal is to keep the 
firm at such a size that the family is able to 
fully manage it.” The exercise of ownership 
and executive rights in the family business 
is firmly under family control. In 2006, the 
company founder  reduced his activity in the 
company as he had reached the retirement 
age. He was subsequently appointed the 
company’s director emeritus for life with the 
right to participate in all of the company’s 
activities as adviser (Annual company re-
port, 2006). Naturally, he also remains one of 
the company’s directors. Therefore, the lead-
ership of the firm transferred smoothly to the 
founder’s children – four siblings.  
Nepotism can be partly seen in this fam-
ily business mainly due to external reasons. 
The company employs the wives of two of 
the founders. According to one of the com-
pany directors: “Over time the company 
also employed two of the older brothers’ 
wives, who had problems finding work after 
their maternity leave. Both relatives were 
employed in management positions. My son 
also works for the firm occasionally.”
The company director also added that: 
“Employing the  two brothers’ wives, who 
joined after their maternity leave, meant 
that the company acquired two very loyal 
employees. The family works very hard for 
the company, and working weekends are not 
an exception. All family members feel very 
close to the family business and would nev-
er change their job. And that goes for our 
children as well – whenever they work here, 
we try to instil in them a feeling of solidar-
ity, loyalty and responsibility towards the 
firm.”
Nevertheless, the interview also re-
vealed that despite positive experiences 
with employees from the close family cir-
cle, the firm’s management resisted employ-
ing members from the extended family. As 
the director stated: “Much more pressure is 
placed upon family members and they are 
under greater pressure because they stand 
out more amongst the staff, and the mem-
bers of the extended family would find that 
difficult to cope with.”
Paternalism in the company could be 
seen in the transfer of the company from 
its founder to his children – his daughter 
(at present a director) and her brothers. The 
company director stated that the company’s 
original founder did not want to give up 
ownership of the company and is still its 
director emeritus in an advisory capacity 
and is still a company director. Paternalism 
can also be seen in the company through 
the family-based centralization of decision 
making and work supervision. The com-
pany tends to take on contracts from the lo-
cal market which can be easily monitored, 
which points to an aversion towards risk 
and related centralization.  
“The family members from the com-
pany’s top management supervise all of the 
construction contracts that the firm is in-
volved in. This fact also impacts the scope 
and breadth of company’s activities. And 
in order to maintain the level of the quality 
of work, most of our contracts are carried 
165
Management, Vol. 23, 2018, No.2, pp. 155-173
P. Odehnalová, P. Pirožek: CORPORATE BOARD COMPOSITION IN FAMILY
out near the company headquarters. Thanks 
to this, we have on average a maximum of 
three complaints per year and these are 
usually down to a mistake on the part of the 
customer. Even in these cases we act in a 
professional manner and try to find a com-
mon solution to the situation” (quote: com-
pany executive).
Although all the partners have an equal 
share in the firm, at present the oldest 
daughter, i.e. the director, has the decisive 
rights in the family business. 
4.1.5. Case study: Family business C.
Board composition – at present the com-
pany has three directors: the firm’s founder, 
his son and daughter. The siblings are also 
partners with a 50% share of the company. 
The directors represent the company inde-
pendently. The board has no other mem-
bers. In this company the exercise of own-
ership and executive rights is delegated 
mainly to the son of the original founder, 
who holds the position of production di-
rector and is responsible for the running 
of the whole company. Therefore, the firm 
transferred smoothly from father to son. 
At present, the son of the original founder 
manages the company, despite the fact that 
the representatives on the board are also his 
sister and the original founder – their father. 
The director’s wife also works for the com-
pany. All of the firm’s activities are concen-
trated in one facility only.
4.1.6. Characteristic phenomena 
Relationship towards risk, centraliza-
tion – the firm’s aversion to risk is reflected 
in the stability of its suppliers and custom-
ers, who are also all family businesses. They 
have known each other for a long time and 
the companies have maintained their long-
term collaboration despite having higher 
prices than the competition. Their customers 
also greatly appreciate the fact that the firm 
has remained in the hands of the family. The 
aversion to risk is evidently the result of the 
responsibility which comes from the aware-
ness of owning a family business. It is evi-
dent that the firm’s management is aware of 
this responsibility and that they try their ut-
most to ensure the firm prospers. The com-
pany management does not plan any changes 
to the ownership structure in the future. As 
they state: “We want to keep the firm in the 
family’s hands. We couldn’t imagine the firm 
being run by anyone else. This is why we’re 
not considering radical expansion” (quote: 
daughter of the original founder).
Orientation and sustainability – the em-
phasis on stability is also apparent in the 
ownership structure which the firm does not 
intend to change. At present they describe 
themselves as being a stable firm with a 
good reputation and they would also like to 
keep this status in the future. The focus on 
company stability is also reflected in their 
unwillingness to enter into new markets. 
The company prefers to focus on expand-
ing the choice for its existing customers. 
The director (the daughter of the company’s 
founder) stated that: ”We want to keep the 
business in family hands and avoid high-
risk activities, so we stress the stability of 
both the buyers and the suppliers.”
Nepotism – nepotism in the company is 
particularly obvious in the case of the found-
er’s daughter who became the head account-
ant. She originally studied in a different field 
and worked outside of commerce. However, 
after a two-year training she joined her par-
ents’ company, where she still works. The 
founder’s son was trained in the family busi-
ness’s commercial enterprise, after which he 
also joined the family business as the tech-
nical and production director. One interest-
ing aspect was the employment of a family 
member – an uncle, as the firm’s locksmith. 
The cooperation with family members at 
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lower positions was not successful and the 
problems at work were also transferred to the 
family life, which led to this member of the 
family leaving the company.
Paternalism – paternalism in this com-
pany was seen mainly through the attempt 
to keep the firm in the hands of the family, 
which was reflected in the family’s central-
izing activities. The founder’s son and 
daughter characterized the management of 
the family business as follows: “We try to 
always give 100%. The firm is everything to 
us and we try to do as much as we can for 
it.” The business is everything for the fam-
ily, and efforts to keep it sustainable are the 
management’s priority . This is reflected in 
their aversion to risk. The current manager 
of the firm and decision-making execu-
tor – the founder’s son– has an overview 
of all of the firm’s activities and makes the 
most important decisions without signifi-
cant interference from other family board 
members. There is, therefore, a high degree 
of centralized decision-making within the 
family business. Nevertheless, according 
to the founder’s daughter, currently a com-
pany director, “it isn’t possible for the firm 
to operate without their presence.” This has 
its negative aspects, such as the difficulty in 
taking long holidays. At the beginning, the 
company management spent 12 to 14 hours 
a day at work including weekends. The 
heavy workload only began to lessen when 
the company became stable. As stated by 
the director: “Even today my brother spends 
all day at work trying to do everything 
possible for the firm. He hardly ever rests. 
There have been so many times when I’ve 
been reluctant to go on holiday, leaving him 
to stay and look after the firm. He lives for 
the firm. It means everything to him.” It was 
also discovered that the founder’s son in-
stilled family values into the business. One 
example of introducing family values to the 
firm was a ban on smoking – as no one in 
the family smoked, the whole company be-
came a non-smoking one.
4.1.7. Case study: Family D.
Board composition – in addition to two 
family executives, father and son, there are 
another two executives who are not part of 
the family and are external employees work-
ing on the board. Over recent years there 
have been several changes to the ownership 
structure, when one of the original found-
ers remained the majority partner with a 
51% share. The other company founder has 
a share of 33% and the last one owns 9 of 
the company%, and none of them is related 
to the original owner. The remaining shares 
are divided between the external members 
of the board. In 2009, the executive’s father 
stopped working for the company and it was 
handed over from one generation to the next. 
However, the remaining two executives are 
still part of the family business.
In 2015, the original family business 
became a non-family one. Therefore, since 
2015 there have been no family connec-
tions. Due to the fact that the founder’s son 
was present from 2009 to 2015 when the 
data and indicators were collected, the firm 
can be considered to be a family one over 
the period monitored. It became a non-
family business in 2015 when the data used 
for this research had already been collected 
and analysed. Therefore, the departure of 
the original founder’s son did not affect re-
search results, though from the perspective 
of providing all relevant data, the authors 
considered it important to mention this fact.
4.1.8. Characteristic phenomena 
Low-level centralization – the firm has 
two independent facilities which are not 
completely autonomous units. Nevertheless, 
according to the company management, 
centralized decision making is at a low lev-
el, which is due to the fact that employees 
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at a lower level decide independently on 
the most important matters concerning con-
struction contracts.
Relationship towards risk, orientation 
towards profit – the relationship towards 
risk in the family business is reflected in 
the presence of high-risk activities. As the 
director of the company (the founder’s son) 
stated: “Many of our activities at the mo-
ment are high-risk. For example, we want 
a contract to modernize blocks of flats in 
Mongolia.” Although these were high-
risk activities, the management attempted 
to secure guarantees from the Mongolian 
government and a Czech bank, Komerční 
Banka. “Our company is also struggling 
with large debts amounting to 135.7 mil-
lion CZK, which represents half of the com-
pany’s assets. Unfortunately, the company 
is in the bankruptcy procees. This is why we 
often use revolving credit in order to oper-
ate.” (quote: company director, founder’s 
son). Due to the company’s less than posi-
tive financial situation, the company also 
uses loans to finance contracts abroad. 
Nepotism – it is possible to identify nep-
otism in the company with the employment 
1 Note: in 2015 the son left the firm to pursue other activities
of the original founder’s son, who himself 
stated that he had originally shown no in-
terest in joining the firm. However, circum-
stances led him to being employed in one 
of the lower positions when he was 19. He, 
therefore, lacked any proper qualifications 
or further education. He gradually learned 
about all of the firm’s activities, so that by 
2015 he became the director of the sales-ad-
ministration division as well as a company 
executive.1 
Paternalism – the firm did not exhibit 
any particularly paternalistic behaviour. 
According to the company’s owner, there 
was no obvious centralized decision-making 
by the family, which is demonstrated by the 
fact that lower-level employees could make 
their own decisions about important issues.
4.2. Phase 2: Synthesis of results
When evaluating the results and carry-
ing out their synthesis, it was possible to 
form a notional image that profiled simi-
larities and differences between individual 
family businesses. As is clear from Table 3, 
it is possible to present the basic profiles be-
tween the family businesses.
Table 3. Results
Firm A Firm B Firm C Firm D
Number of non-family top managers (in the 
year 2015) 0 0 0 2
Historical continuity dating before 1948 yes no no no
Orientation towards profit/maintenance of 
company maintenance maintenance maintenance profit
Level of centralization high high high low
Relationship towards risk aversion aversion aversion inclination
Nepotism no yes yes yes
Paternalism no yes yes no
Succession No Yes Yes Yes
Gender diversity in the Board-female no yes yes no
ROA indicator (CAGR) in years 2006 - 2015 
(graph 3) -1.86 -0.25 -0.12 -2.31
Debt 13.95% 62.83% 49.06% 87.75%
Source: authors according to internal materials of the observed companies
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The following characteristic phenomena 
could be observed in the family businesses 
with various board compositions, all of 
which were established during the transi-
tion economy. When interpreting the results 
some caution is required concerning exter-
nal members of the board. There was only 
one company which had board representa-
tives who came from outside the family. 
The orientation towards company sustaina-
bility, which is typical for this type of busi-
ness, was evident in three of the companies 
under observation. There was only one case 
which had a different orientation towards 
profit, where external members of the board 
were also represented. 
There was also a greater level of central-
ization connected with all of the companies 
which stated their intention of remaining a 
family business. The family businesses also 
showed a general aversion towards risk. As 
we discovered, the representation of exter-
nal board members can reduce risk aver-
sion. The results examining nepotism and 
paternalism may have been ambiguous, 
but they were all the more interesting for 
it. These findings pointed to the occurrence 
of both characteristics in only some of the 
family businesses. The results concerning 
the representation of women on the board 
showed that women were actively involved 
in the board if they were part of the family 
that managed the firm.
Companies that do not have external 
representatives on the board declared the 
strategy employed as defensive, as well as 
centralization and aversion towards risk.
The impact which these characteris-
tic phenomena of family businesses, in the 
form of the strategies they employ, has on 
the strategic adaptability and direction of 
the companies, is measured by the eco-
nomic results in individual years in order to 
compare the results.
4.2.1. Economic results – ROA in 
individual years 
Graph no. 1 presents the development 
of economic indicator for the return on as-
sets of family businesses. As is clear from 
the graph, firms A, B and C are stable busi-
nesses. Over the period monitored, family 
businesses B and C showed positive eco-
nomic activity through their positive eco-
nomic results and the corresponding ROA 
indicator. Family business A achieved a 
balanced economic activity when the eco-
nomic results for the last three years were 
completely balanced between income and 
expenses. Table 3 also shows how cautious 
family businesses A and C are in terms of 
debt and their attitudes to risk. On the other 
hand, firm B has higher debt despite claim-
ing to be averse to risk. Family business D 
did not achieve very positive economic re-
sults; it describes itself as being positive to-
wards risk and is quite heavily in debt. In 
terms of their long-term activities, the fam-
ily businesses which demonstrated char-
acteristic phenomena such as paternalism, 
nepotism, orientation towards company 
sustainability, aversion to risk and centrali-
zation, were better off in the assessment 
of their economic situation. The impact of 
their long-term behaviour can be compared 
with the company where the characteristic 
phenomena were not assessed more posi-
tively. These companies were able to em-
ploy strategies which withstood negative 
external phenomena such as the economic 
crisis. The characteristic behaviours which 
determined their strategies during the pe-
riod under observation were evidently the 
reason why the impact on their current di-
rection had positive results.
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5. CONCLUSION
Contemporary theoretical approaches 
address the issue of the influence of fami-
ly-business board composition from the 
perspective of strategic adaptability and 
the representation of external members 
(Berrone et al, 2010; Zellweger et al., 2013; 
Ponomareva & Ahlberg, 2016; McKee et 
al., 1989). There has been little research 
into gender diversity in family businesses 
and its influence on strategic adaptabil-
ity and it tends to focus on strategies em-
ployed rather than strategic adaptability 
(Cesaroni & Sentuti, 2014). There has been 
no research into the influence of transition 
economy from the perspective of board 
composition – i.e. the representation of ex-
ternal members and gender diversity – on 
the strategic adaptability of companies. This 
longitudinal study of four family businesses 
provides valuable information on family 
business in a transition economy. 
The results of research into these 
companies showed that if there is gen-
der diversity on the board of a family 
business established in the transition econ-
omy (Adams & Funk, 2011), if there is also 
equal asset share in the firm and no external 
members (Berrone et al., 2010; Zellweger 
et al., 2013), then there is a higher degree 
of strategic adaptability. The behaviour 
of boards of family businesses A, B and 
C was characterised by the phenomena of 
nepotism, paternalism, orientation towards 
sustainability, risk aversion, and centrali-
zation, and they were able to adapt to the 
environment substantially better than the 
company that did not meet these conditions. 
The research and the results which were 
achieved can also be viewed in the context 
of the economic crisis (Gallizo et al., 2014), 
which also had an impact on Czech family 
businesses. It was thanks to strategic adapt-
ability in the face of these negative external 
conditions that family businesses exclusive-
ly in the hands of the family and exhibiting 
gender diversity coped better with this ob-
stacle. There were also interesting findings 
concerning the differences between family 
members who became managers and fam-
ily members who became employees. The 
Graph 1. ROA in individual years of cooperating family firms
 Source: authors according to internal materials of the observed companies
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difference could be the result of the respon-
sibility of managers who are also business 
owners so they are more motivated to sus-
tain the business for their successors. 
Despite all of these findings, we are nat-
urally aware of research limitations , par-
ticularly for measuring a company’s success 
using ROA and indebtedness indicators. 
The sample is also limited in terms of the 
industry sector as only the manufacturing 
industry is represented, although it should 
be stressed that it is the dominant sec-
tor in the Czech Republic’s economy. It is 
also necessary to point out that only family 
businesses from the Czech Republic were 
selected and, therefore, it is impossible to 
generalize these findings for countries in a 
transition economy, specifically in Central 
and Eastern Europe. Another limitation was 
caused by the lack of willingness of some 
companies to be part of the research, which 
was relatively complex and long-running. 
Last limitation was the fact that we 
looked for companies that had been pre-
sent on the market for some time and had 
a healthy economic situation, so the results 
represent only successful family firms.
Nevertheless, we can point to undis-
puted benefits from this study relating in 
particular to the acquisition of information 
on the development of family businesses in 
post-transition economies, specifically the 
findings on the family firms board compo-
sition and sustainability and ability of these 
firms to withstand unfavourable market 
conditions.  
In light of these findings, further re-
search could focus on family businesses 
from the viewpoint of shared information 
(Gatarik & Born, 2017), specifically the 
influence of the ageing board and its influ-
ence on the strategic adaptability of family 
businesses.
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SASTAV KORPORACIJSKOG ODBORA U OBITELJSKIM 
PODUZEĆIMA: DOKAZI IZ ČEŠKE REPUBLIKE
Sažetak
U ovom se radu istražuje problematika 
sastava korporacijskog odbora u obiteljskim 
poduzećima, osnovanim u Češkoj Republici u 
1990-tim godinama, nakon 40 godina potiskivan-
ja privatnih poduzeća od strane socijalističkog 
režima. Do sada nije bilo raspoloživog istraži-
vanja proizvodnog sektora u Češkoj Republici s 
aspekta sastava odbora, tj. zastupljenosti vanj-
skih članova i rodne raznolikosti, uključivši i 
karakteristike ponašanja odbora u obiteljskim 
poduzećima i njihovu stratešku prilagodljivost. 
Ovo longitudinalno istraživanje četiri obiteljska 
poduzeća pruža značajne informacije, koje se 
još nisu analizirale u kontekstu sastava odbora 
u proizvodnom sektoru. Rezultati intervjua, pro-
vedenih u ovim poduzećima, pružaju zanimljive 
spoznaje o pozitivnom utjecaju rodne raznoli-
kosti i ekskluzivnom zastupanju članova obitelji 
u odboru na stratešku prilagodljivost te utjecaj 
na tekuće usmjerenje poslovanja. Rezultati rada 
također pokazuju da su obiteljska poduzeća, 
koja ispunjavaju navedene uvjete, sposobnija za 
suočavanje s negativnim vanjskim utjecajima, što 
se, u ovom slučaju, odnosi na financijsku krizu.
Ključne riječi: sastav odbor, obiteljska po-
duzeća, tranzicijsko gospodarstvo, rod, nepoti-
zam, paternalizam, strateška prilagodljivost
